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CRIMINAL LAW
CAPITAL FELONY MERGER
WILLIAM W. BERRY III*
Capital felony murder statutes continue to enable states to sentence
criminal defendants to death. These are often individuals who possessed no
intent to kill and, in some cases, did not kill. These statutes remain
constitutionally dubious under the basic principles of the Eighth Amendment,
but the United States Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency
doctrine has proved an ineffective tool to remedy these injustices.
This Article proposes a novel doctrinal approach by which the Court
could promote more consistent sentencing outcomes in felony murder cases.
Specifically, the Article argues for the adoption of a constitutional felony
merger doctrine that “merges” the crimes of felony murder and first-degree
murder in capital cases. Just as felony murder cannot serve as a tool by
which prosecutors can convert second-degree assault killings into firstdegree murders, felony murder should also not serve as a tool to convert
noncapital crimes into capital ones.
In Part I, the Article describes the use of capital felony murder and
explains its constitutional infirmities under the Eighth Amendment. Part II
explains the Supreme Court’s failed attempts to apply the Eighth Amendment
to capital felony murder cases and why the Court’s doctrine remains an
ineffective tool to remedy these injustices. In Part III, the Article proposes a
new constitutional merger doctrine for capital felony murder cases. Finally,
in Part IV, the Article makes the case for adopting a capital felony merger
doctrine and explores its consequences.

* Montague Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. The author thanks the editors of
the JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY for their outstanding editing work on this
Article.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past half-century, felony murder has remained one of the
most criticized crimes in U.S. academic circles.1 At the heart of this criticism
rests its lack of a mens rea requirement related to the homicide in question.2
Still, the crime of felony murder persists3 and, perhaps more significantly,
remains punishable by the death penalty.4
Dating back to its common law origins, the criminal law has categorized
homicides as either murder or manslaughter based on the mental state (mens
rea) of the killer.5 Generally speaking, in cases where the killer exhibits
malice, the crime is murder; in cases where the killer does not exhibit malice,
the crime is the less serious manslaughter.6 The offender’s mens rea7
1
For a brief summary of early criticism, see Jeane Hall Seibold, Note, The Felony-Murder
Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133, 134 n.1 (1978) (“The felony-murder
doctrine has been the subject of vitriolic criticism for centuries.”); see also George P. Fletcher,
Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 417 (1980); James J. Hippard, The
Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional
Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 HOUS. L. REV. 1039, 1045 (1973); Maynard E. Pirsig, Proposed
Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47 MINN. L. REV. 417, 427–28 (1963) (The felony
murder rule is “highly punitive and objectionable as imposing the consequences of murder
upon a death wholly unintended.”); Frederick J. Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony
Murder, 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 1176 (1958); Norval Morris, The Felon’s Responsibility for the
Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50 (1956). But see David Crump & Susan White
Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359 (1985).
2
The most common example relates to a robbery where the robber accidentally kills
someone during the robbery and receives the same punishment as if he premeditated the
killing. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133–35 (Cal. 1965); SAMUEL H.
PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 106, 108
(1998).
3
See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & TYLER SCOT WILLIAMS, MAPPING AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW 45–52 (2018) (describing the current use of felony murder in the United States
and showing that forty-three of fifty states use a traditional form of felony murder); see also
State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J. 1994); People v. Howard, 104 P.3d 107, 111
(Cal. 2005); Crump & Crump, supra note 1 (noting the persistence of felony murder despite
consistent scholarly criticism).
4
Summary of State Death Penalty Statutes, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2021)
[hereinafter Summary of State Death Penalty Statute], https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-andresearch/crimes-punishable-by-death/summary-of-state-death-penalty-statutes.
5
See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 664 N.W.2d 685, 692 (Mich. 2003) (“[T]he only element
distinguishing murder from manslaughter is malice.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *199 (stating that malice aforethought is the “grand criterion which now
distinguishes murder from other killing”); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 504–05 (7th ed. 2015).
6
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 504–08.
7
For a basic overview of the concept of mens rea, see for example, JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 70–104 (2d ed. 1960); DRESSLER, supra note 5,
at 117–45; Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 57 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51 (2003);

608

BERRY

[Vol. 111

therefore defines a critical element of the categorization and corresponding
punishment for homicide crimes.8
Closely related to the concept of mens rea is the act of homicide itself—
the actus reus.9 Homicide requires a defendant to act10 in a way that actually
and proximately causes the death of a human being.11 As it is impossible to
Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
815 (1980); Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1939);
Frances Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 n.2 (1932) [hereinafter Sayre,
Mens Rea].
8
Historically, criminal law rests on the idea that one must intend to commit a criminal act
to be guilty of a crime. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015)
(explaining that the “central thought” of U.S. criminal law is that a defendant must be
“blameworthy in mind” to be guilty); BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *21 (“[A]s a vi[c]ious
will without a vi[c]ious act is no civil crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act
without a vi[c]ious will is no crime at all.”). There is, of course, an exception to this—strict
liability crimes, in which the act itself is enough to establish a crime. But such crimes are
limited to public welfare crimes and the Supreme Court explicitly disfavors strict liability
outside of that context. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)
(reading a mens rea standard into a federal statute); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (explaining that statutes without a mens rea standard have a “generally
disfavored status” and indicating an interpretive presumption in favor of a mens rea standard,
even when a statute is silent). For a deeper exploration of the presumption against strict
liability crimes and strict liability generally, see Arthur Leavens, Beyond Blame—Mens Rea
and Regulatory Crime, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1 (2007); Morse, supra note 7; John Shepard
Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal
Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999); Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Liability
Just?, 87 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075 (1997) [hereinafter Simons, When is Strict Liability
Just?]; Douglas N. Husak, Varieties of Strict Liability, 8 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 189 (1995)
[hereinafter Husak, Varieties of Strict Liability]; Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the
Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107 (1962); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in
the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960); Frances Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933) [hereinafter Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses].
9
See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 85–116; Paul H.
Robinson, Should Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus-Mens Rea Distinction?, in ACTION
AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 187 (Stephen Shute, John Gardner & Jeremy Horder eds., 1993);
Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the
Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345 (1965).
10
Under most statutes, criminal acts must be voluntary. For a discussion of the
voluntariness requirement generally, see Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking
Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545 (2013); Douglas N. Husak, Rethinking the Act
Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437 (2007); Deborah W. Denno, Crime and
Consequences: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269 (2002); Larry Alexander,
Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in
Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84 (1990); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563 (1980).
11
See generally HALL, supra note 7, at 247–95; H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of
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download the subjective intent from a killer’s mind, juries and judges often
infer the mens rea by examining the killer’s behavior.12
A corollary concept, the offender’s culpability, can also play a role in
distinguishing between murder and manslaughter. Culpability refers to the
individual’s blameworthiness for the homicide.13 The category14 of mens
rea15—the degree to which an individual intended to kill—can often
correspond to the level of blame ascribed to the killer.16
But the concepts of mens rea and culpability can diverge in criminal
law. In strict liability crimes,17 for instance, the offender’s culpability relates
only to the actus reus; the mens rea is irrelevant.18 With the exception of
public welfare crimes, the Supreme Court disfavors strict liability crimes,

the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994); Michael S. Moore, Causation, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 150 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002); DRESSLER, supra
note 5, at 181–99; Paul K. Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773 (1958);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of
Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974).
12
See, e.g., State v. Myers, 81 A.2d 710, 714 (N.J. 1951); State v. Thompson, 578 So. 2d
1151, 1154 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
13
According to Professor Dressler, culpability overlaps with mens rea when it concerns
the moral blameworthiness of the individual’s conduct as distinguished from the individual’s
actual intent. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 118; see also Melanie Myers, Felony Killings and
Prosecutions for Murder: Exploring the Tension Between Culpability and Consequences in
the Criminal Law, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 149 (1994).
14
The Model Penal Code, for instance, uses four categories of mens rea: purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Am. L. Inst. 1962).
15
Note that this does not mean that the defendant must be aware that the conduct in
question is illegal. Ignorance of the law is generally not an excuse. United States v. Int’l
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971); People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068,
1069 (N.Y. 1987). See generally HALL, supra note 7, at 382–414; Kenneth W. Simons,
Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
487 (2012); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous,
96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997); Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined,
17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 671 (1976).
16
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (referring to mens rea as an “evilmeaning mind”); Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (explaining that a defendant
must be “blameworthy in mind” to be guilty); BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *21 (1769)
(referring to mens rea as a “vi[c]ious will”); Frances Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification
of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 402 (1934) (referring to
mens rea as “a general immorality of motive”).
17
See generally Leavens, supra note 8; Morse, supra note 7; Wiley, Jr., supra note 8;
Simons, When Is Strict Liability Just?, supra note 8; Husak, Varieties of Strict Liability, supra
note 8; Packer, supra note 8; Wasserstrom, supra note 8; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, supra
note 8.
18
See sources cited supra note 17.

610

BERRY

[Vol. 111

often choosing to infer a mens rea requirement even where a statute does not
contain one explicitly.19
Felony murder, though, provides a counterexample to the Court’s
veneration of the mens rea requirement, and it does so in the context of the
serious crime of homicide.20 Felony murder is a strict liability crime with
respect to the criminal homicide in question.21 In most jurisdictions, to be
guilty of felony murder, an individual must have committed a felony, the
commission of which caused someone to die.22
There typically is no required mens rea with respect to the homicide in
a felony murder case, only the intent to commit the felony.23 With felonies
involving multiple defendants, an individual can also commit felony murder
without causing death in a proximate or meaningful way—i.e., literally
pulling the trigger—as long as the individual participates in the felony.24 On
its face, the felony operates as a kind of constructive malice that justifies
elevating the homicide to first-degree murder.
As explored below, there are a number of rationales for felony murder
statutes, but the concept of culpability rests at the center of the analysis.25 To
justify felony murder, the commission of the underlying felony must, in some
way, give rise to a level of culpability that allows the mens rea of the felony
to substitute for the mens rea of the homicide. For example, a person must
rob a bank in a manner that makes them culpable in the death of the security
guard at the hands of their accomplice or the police.
The problem becomes that these statutes create an umbrella of murder
under which cases of disparate levels of culpability receive the same
19
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (explaining that
statutes without a mens rea have a “generally disfavored status” and indicating an interpretive
presumption in favor of a mens rea, even when a statute is silent); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250
(1952) (reading a mens rea standard into a federal statute). This principle pre-dates the Court.
See, e.g., Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 7, at 974 n.2 (“The general rule of English law is, that
no crime can be committed unless there is mens rea. It is a sacred principle of criminal
jurisprudence, that the intention to commit the crime, is of the essence of the crime, and to
hold, that a man shall be held criminally responsible for an offense, of the commission of
which he was ignorant at the time, would be intolerable tyranny.”) (citations omitted).
20
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 30 (AM. L. INST. 1980); see BLACKSTONE, supra note
5, at *200–01 (“And if one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is
also murder.”); State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
21
See sources cited supra note 20.
22
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 53; sources cited supra note 20.
23
See ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 53 (“[The felony murder] rule essentially
imputes to the defendant the standard culpability required for murder . . . based on his
commission of the underfelying felony.”).
24
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
25
See ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 53.
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punishment.26 Felony murder can encompass both a premeditated killing of
a personal enemy and the heart attack of a bystander witnessing a theft crime
in which the defendant had no intent to kill.27 This difference may be more
pronounced in states that separate murder into degrees, with felony murder
often receiving the same categorization as the most serious murders.28
The end run around mens rea that felony murder statutes allow is
especially striking where felony murder can lead to the death penalty. Indeed,
it is troubling to think that states have executed—and likely will continue to
execute—individuals that never intended to kill.
The Eighth Amendment,29 which bars cruel and unusual punishments,
offers a possible bulwark against such anomalous uses of state power.30 On
its face, it seems “cruel and unusual” to execute an individual that did not
intend to kill or killed accidentally. Even worse, imposing a death sentence
on someone not directly involved in the killing seems like an excessive31 and
outrageously rare32 occurrence. This becomes particularly true in light of the
Supreme Court’s teaching that only the worst homicides should be eligible
for the death penalty.33
Despite this logic, the Supreme Court has not resolved the capital felony
murder problem because of its Eighth Amendment evolving standards of
decency doctrine, which examines punishments categorically using objective
and subjective indicia.34 The structure of this constitutional test is
incongruent with the mens rea problem presented by felony murder statutes.
Further, the Court’s recent shift to the right makes the expansion of the
Eighth Amendment evolving standards of decency doctrine with respect to

26

See generally sources cited supra note 1.
See ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 55.
28
Id., at 57.
29
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
30
See discussion infra Parts I.A., II.
31
“Excessive” is a synonym for “cruel” under the Eighth Amendment. See John F.
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97
VA. L. REV. 899, 968–69 (2011). For a more extensive discussion of the current and future
development of the Eighth Amendment, see generally MEGHAN J. RYAN & WILLIAM W. BERRY
III, THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF PUNISHMENT (2020).
32
“Rare” is a synonym for “unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. See John F.
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1767 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning
of “Unusual”].
33
See discussion infra Part I.A.
34
See discussion infra Parts II.A., II.B.
27

612

BERRY

[Vol. 111

felony murder unlikely in the near future.35 Nonetheless, both conservatives
and liberals would, in theory, welcome a more consistent application of
criminal sentencing in capital felony murder cases even though they might
differ as to the scope and nature of punishments.
To that end, this Article proposes a novel doctrinal approach by which
the Court could promote more consistent sentencing outcomes in felony
murder cases. Specifically, the Article argues for the adoption of a
constitutional merger doctrine that “merges” the crimes felony murder and
first-degree murder in capital cases. Just as felony murder cannot serve as a
tool by which prosecutors can convert second-degree assault killings into
first-degree murders, felony murder should also not serve as a tool to convert
noncapital crimes into capital ones.
In Part I, the Article describes the use of capital felony murder and
explains its constitutional infirmities under the Eighth Amendment. Part II
explores the Supreme Court’s failed attempts to apply the Eighth
Amendment evolving standards of decency doctrine to capital felony murder
cases and why the Court’s doctrine remains an ineffective tool to remedy
these injustices. In Part III, the Article proposes a new constitutional merger
doctrine for capital felony murder cases. Finally, in Part IV, the Article makes
the case for adopting the capital felony merger doctrine.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH CAPITAL FELONY MURDER
To assess the relationship of the constitution to capital felony murder, it
is instructive to consider the crime’s origins. The origins of felony murder
remain murky36 but, as with many criminal law rules, derive in part from the
English common law.37 At common law, felony murder was a malice crime,
but the malice was implied, not express.38 The implied malice related to the

35

See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019) (upholding a brutal,
torturous execution); Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthonykennedy-retire-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/66KS-EBRL].
36
See Fletcher, supra note 1, at 421 (1981) (describing the “historical roots” of felonymurder as “tenuous and ill defined”); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder
Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 449–50, 492 (1985)
(discussing “disputed origins” of the rule and stating that the doctrine arose from “obscure
historical origins”).
37
See Paul James, The Felony Murder Doctrine, 1 CRIM. L. Q. 33, 33 (1962); but see
Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 63 (2004)
(arguing that the existence of an English common law felony murder rule is a myth).
38
Hale referred to them as “malice in fact” and “malice in law.” James, supra note 37, at
36; see also 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 21, 57 (1883) (exploring the
intersection between malice and felony murder).
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commission of the underlying felony.39 This meant that the malice required
for murder came from the nature of the felony, not the nature of the
homicide.40 As the penalty for any felony crime was death, the intellectual
gap between malice based on the felony and malice based on the homicide
did not really exist.41 The presence of felonious malice, whether in the
commission of a felony during which a death occurred or in the actual
homicide, resulted in the same penalty: death.42
Over time, a sentencing gap emerged as states limited the death penalty
to only rapes and homicides,43 while punishing other felonies with
imprisonment.44 This meant that felony murder convictions, as capital
homicide crimes, could rest on a mens rea, an actus reus related to a
nonhomicide felony, or both. This was true even though the underlying
felonies could not result in a death sentence.
The British response to the changing norms with respect to felony
sentencing was to abolish the crime of felony murder.45 In the United States,
however, capital felony murder persists in most death penalty states.46
Indeed, this tradition has morphed into the present statutory norm in most
capital states, where the crime of felony murder makes one eligible for the
death penalty.47
39

See Myers, supra note 13, at 150; James, supra note 37, at 37.
See Myers, supra note 13, at 150; James, supra note 37, at 37.
41
James, supra note 37, at 37–38.
42
Id.
43
In the modern, post-Furman era, state governments and the federal government reserve
the death penalty exclusively for homicides, except in rare situations. See, e.g., Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (finding death sentences for child rape unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment and categorizing non-homicide crimes that could be
constitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (finding death sentences for rape
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). As the Court in Kennedy explained,
Our concern here is limited to crimes against individual persons. We do not address, for
example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin
activity, which are offenses against the State. As it relates to crimes against individuals,
though, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s life was not
taken.
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 413.
44
See generally Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in
America, 12 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35 (1921).
45
See James, supra note 387, at 38–39.
46
Twenty-six of the twenty-eight death penalty states use capital felony murder.
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 55–57; see discussion supra Part I.B.1.
47
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 55–57; Aggravating Factors by State, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2021) [hereinafter Aggravating Factors by State],
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/crimes-punishable-by-death/aggravatingfactors-by-state.
40
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The justifications for felony murder48 fall into several categories:
deterring criminal conduct, reaffirming the sanctity of human life,
transferring intent between individuals, and easing the state’s burden of
proof.49 Proponents most often defend felony murder by arguing that it deters
felonious behavior50 by seriously punishing any deaths that occur during the
commission of felonies.51 According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
law should place the punishment on the individual committing the felony as
a risk of engaging in such conduct, even when the death is accidental.52
A corollary to this argument is the sanctity of human life argument,
which justifies felony murder on the grounds that committing a felony that
results in death is more serious than other felonies53 and, thus, deserves a
more serious punishment.54 It requires suspension of a core principle driving
criminal law punishments—intent—by replacing it with the harm caused as
the determinant of the outcome.55
48

Most courts have embraced felony murder. See Crump & Crump, supra note 1.
Although, many have argued that there is no adequate justification for felony murder. See,
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 37 (AM. L. INST. 1980) (“Principled argument in favor
of felony-murder doctrine is hard to find.”); State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J.
1994) (“The ancient rule . . . has been bombarded by intense criticism and constitutional
attack.”); Roth & Sundby, supra note 36, at 446 (“Criticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon
of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine . . . .”).
49
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 518–21.
50
The weight of the authority with respect to death penalty deterrence suggests that it does
not deter crime. John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence
in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005) (noting that “existing evidence
for deterrence is surprisingly fragile”). See generally Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment
Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV.
751 (2005) (arguing that the weight of the evidence shows that capital punishment does not
deter murder). But see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005) (arguing that
executions are morally required if they deter murders). Part of the explanation for this may be
the long period of time between the conviction and the execution—typically more than a
decade. See generally Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-on
Sentence, 46 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 1 (1995).
51
People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965). The mens rea disconnect—the
intent to commit the crime as opposed to the intent to kill—is probably the most common
rejoinder to this argument. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 519; infra note 125 and accompanying
text.
52
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 59 (1881).
53
This argument in a way provides a death-is-different argument from the victim’s
perspective as opposed to the defendant’s, meaning that the difference in outcome—death—
makes a higher punishment warranted, irrespective of intent.
54
Crump & Crump, supra note 1, at 361–69.
55
To be fair, just deserts retribution incorporates both principles—culpability of the
criminal actor and harm caused by the conduct. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH &
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005). But
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The next justification for felony murder relates to transferred intent—
the intent to commit a felony is sufficient to provide a basis for murder.56
This view rests on the idea that possessing a criminal intent satisfies the mens
rea concern about not imposing strict liability; there is some criminal intent,
even if not to kill. 57
Finally, some justify felony murder as a tool to ease the burden on
prosecutors in homicide cases.58 Rather than charging individuals with firstdegree murder and having to prove intent, prosecutors can charge individuals
with felony murder. The effect is an easier ability to achieve a plea
agreement, but it does not bear as much on the death penalty itself. In other
words, prosecutors will charge the death penalty as an incentive to convince
the defendant to plead guilty to avoid the risk of execution.
It is also worth noting, partially in light of the felony murder doctrine’s
dubious mens rea requirement, that states have placed some limits on felony
murder. First, the felony must be inherently dangerous.59 Some states
catalogue specific crimes in their statutes;60 other states limit the application
of statutes to certain crimes based on the abstract danger of the felony.61
Second, courts impose a res gestae requirement on felony murder,
meaning that the death must occur during the commission of the crime.62 This
requirement has time, distance, and causation requirements and ensures a link
between the crime and the death.63
Finally, and most importantly for purposes of this Article, courts impose
an independent felony merger requirement.64 Where the felony is not
independent of the act of killing, the two concepts merge, and felony murder
cannot serve as a tool to otherwise increase the degree of murder in a case.65

the effect is to move toward a scheme of strict liability, which is perhaps acceptable for a
public welfare crime, but not as much for homicide.
56
State v. O’Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1980); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 520.
57
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
58
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 521.
59
People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 900 (Cal. 1984); Fisher v. State, 786 A.2d 706, 727
(Md. 2001); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 521–22.
60
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 59 n.6, 60 n.8, 61 n.11, 62 n.13; Summary of
State Death Penalty Statutes, supra note 4.
61
People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 558 (Cal. 1989); State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696,
701 (Minn. 2003); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 521–22.
62
State v. Leech, 790 P.2d 160, 163 (Wash. 1990); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 525–27.
63
State v. Griffin, 112 P.3d 862, 870 (Kan. 2005); People v. Gillis, 712 N.W.2d 419, 432–
33 (Mich. 2006); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 525–27.
64
People v. Chun, 203 P.3d 425 (Cal. 2009); Lewis v. State, 22 So. 3d 753, 184–85 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 523–24.
65
See discussion infra Part III.A.
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For instance, if an individual assaults another person and the force of their
assault kills the person, the crime cannot be a felony murder. This is because
the act of killing and the felony of assault were the same act; there was no
independent felony. As discussed in Part III, this concept provides the model
for the capital felony merger doctrine this Article proposes.
A. THE NARROWING THE CLASS OF MURDERERS REQUIREMENT

At its core, capital felony murder warrants strong objections because it
contradicts the Supreme Court’s modern reasoning concerning the death
penalty and the scope of acceptable punishments under the Eighth
Amendment. In its landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,66 the Court
struck down the death penalty as applied under the Eighth Amendment.67 The
per curiam decision in Furman found that the death penalty, as applied,
violated the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment.68 This
decision had the practical effect of striking down the death penalty nationally.
Although two justices rejected the death penalty as a per se
unconstitutional punishment,69 the controlling part of the concurring opinions
centered on the death penalty’s constitutional infirmity because states applied
it in an arbitrary and random manner.70 In other words, the Eighth
Amendment requires, at the very least, that states impose death sentences in
a manner that is not arbitrary and random.71
In five separate opinions, the majority justices enunciated two principles
central to any evaluation of whether the death penalty, as applied, is
constitutional—(1) death is different;72 and (2) the Eighth Amendment
66

408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
70
Id. at 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (likening the death penalty to being struck by
lightning because it was “so wantonly and so freakishly imposed”); id. at 293 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“Indeed, [the administration of the death penalty] smacks of little more than a
lottery system.”); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes . . . there is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”).
71
As Justice Brennan explained:
No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the
few who die from the many who go to prison. Crimes and criminals simply do not
admit of a distinction that can be drawn so finely as to explain, on that ground, the
execution of such a tiny sample of those eligible.
Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
72
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370
(1995) (crediting Justice Brennan as the originator of this line of argument); see also Furman,
67
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requires states to provide some intelligible principle to separate the homicide
crimes eligible for the death penalty from those that are not.73 Over time, the
Court clearly established both principles in its cases.74 These principles apply
in all capital contexts, whether the charged crime is first-degree murder or
felony murder.
The “death is different”75 concept, elucidated in Furman,76 served as the
basis for the Court drawing an Eighth Amendment bright line that accords
capital cases much higher constitutional scrutiny than noncapital cases.77 The
Court considers the death penalty to be a different, higher form of punishment
because it is the most severe punishment that the state can impose—the
taking of a human life.78 The death penalty is also different, according to the
Court, because it constitutes an irrevocable punishment; there is no way to

408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the United
States.”); Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital
Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004) (discussing the Court’s death-is-different
jurisprudence).
73
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652–53 (1990); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870
(1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 198 (1976).
74
The Court has long held that “death is different.” See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 616–17 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining as “death is not reversible,” DNA
evidence that the convictions of numerous persons on death row are unreliable is especially
alarming); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) (“[T]he death sentence is unique
in its severity and in its irrevocability . . . .”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that death differs from life imprisonment because of
its “finality”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (noting that “[t]here is no question that death as a
punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability”).
75
In recent years, the Court has expanded the category of “different” cases to include
juvenile life without parole sentences. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)
(applying the Court’s decision in Miller retroactively and reaffirming the principle that
juveniles are different); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (proscribing mandatory
juvenile life without parole sentences under the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010) (barring the imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences on individuals
for non-homicide crimes).
76
See sources cited supra note 72.
77
Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009)
(acknowledging the Court’s different treatment of capital cases). See generally Douglas A.
Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture of Death,” 34
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 861 (2008).
78
Some have argued that life without parole constitutes a more severe punishment, but
the Court has been consistent in its view.
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undo its infliction.79 The imposition of a death sentence is final because the
inmate dies.80
In Gregg v. Georgia81 and its companion cases,82 the Court reinstated
the death penalty and emphasized the second principle—that a constitutional
capital punishment system must narrow the class of murderers eligible for
the death penalty.83 According to the plurality, the states that had
constitutional systems used some legislative tool, such as aggravating
factors84 or jury questions,85 as a basis for separating out the “worst of the
worst” murderers who would be eligible for the death penalty from gardenvariety murderers that would not be.86
The debate between Justices Stevens and Scalia in Walton v. Arizona
concerning the nature of individualized sentencing consideration underscores
the importance of the narrowing principle.87 In Walton, Scalia argued that
requiring individualized sentencing determinations was contradictory to the
narrowing principle Gregg required.88 Specifically, Scalia claimed that
considering each case individually after narrowing the class of murderers
based on aggravating factors89 effectively reintroduced the arbitrariness and

79
See supra note 74. This is not an insubstantial concern. There have been one hundred
and sixty-five individuals exonerated from death row after being found innocent. Innocence,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2021), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/innocence
[https://perma.cc/BF5X-KZUL].
80
See supra note 74.
81
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
82
The Court decided four other cases on the same day as Gregg, upholding Florida’s and
Texas’s death penalty statutes and striking down North Carolina’s and Louisiana’s death
penalty statutes. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
83
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07.
84
Id.; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259–60.
85
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276–77.
86
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07.
87
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656–73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); id. at 708
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 656–73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Scalia colorfully explained,
To acknowledge that ‘there perhaps is an inherent tension’ between this line of cases and the
line stemming from Furman, is rather like saying that there was perhaps an inherent tension
between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II. And to refer to the two lines as
pursuing ‘twin objectives,’ is rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil. They
cannot be reconciled.
Id. at 664 (internal citations omitted).
89
Interestingly, felony murder serves as an aggravating factor in most jurisdictions. See
Aggravating Factors by State, supra note 47.
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randomness that the Court sought to eliminate.90 By contrast, Stevens
explained that assessing the individualized characteristics of each offender
complimented, as opposed to undid, the narrowing of those individuals
eligible for the death penalty.91 The one thing the Justices agreed upon,
however, was the primacy of the narrowing principle as a constitutional
requirement needed to address the Eighth Amendment problem of random
and arbitrary capital sentencing outcomes that Furman highlighted.92
B. THE FLAWED ELEMENTS OF CAPITAL FELONY MURDER

Because the Eighth Amendment compels a high level of defendant
culpability prior to issuing a death sentence, execution is reserved for only
the most serious felons—those with aggravated murder convictions. The
constitutionality of felony murder statutes should rest, at least in part, on
satisfying this premise. In practice, however, the traditional elements of
capital felony murder diverge from this ideal.
In most jurisdictions, felony murder is categorized as first-degree
murder.93 In an overwhelming majority of capital jurisdictions, felony
murder can yield the death penalty as a form of aggravated murder, often
with the underlying felonies counting as aggravating factors.94
A close examination of the elements of felony murder suggests states
should reach the opposite conclusion and decide that felony murder should
never be a capital crime.95 Felony murder, by itself, does not constitute
aggravated murder even though most state statutes indicate otherwise.96
Specifically, the act and intent requirements of felony murder and their
90

Walton, 497 U.S. at 656–73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92
It is not clear that any of the Furman problems have actually been solved. See Glossip
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cataloging all of the many flaws with
the modern death penalty in the United States, including arbitrariness); Walker v. Georgia,
555 U.S. 979 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also William W.
Berry III, Unusual Deference, 70 FLA. L. REV. 315 (2018) [hereinafter Berry, Unusual
Deference]. Indeed, three justices have renounced the death penalty after initially affirming it.
See generally William W. Berry III, Repudiating Death, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439
(2011) [hereinafter Berry, Repudiating Death].
93
See ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56–57; see generally GUYORA BINDER,
FELONY MURDER (2012).
94
Aggravating Factors by State, supra note 47; Summary of State Death Penalty Statutes,
supra note 4.
95
When I say capital crime here, I mean that all felony murders should not be eligible for
the death penalty. Juries increasingly choose not to sentence individuals to death for deatheligible crimes, instead choosing life-without-parole sentences as an alternative. Of course,
life without parole constitutes its own kind of death sentence.
96
See Summary of State Death Penalty Statutes, supra note 4.
91
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relationship to the purposes of punishment indicate that felony murder does
not possess any of the narrowing qualities required under the Court’s
jurisprudence. The commission of a felony during which a death occurs does
not indicate any particular severity of killing at all. A felony murder could
involve a premeditated cold-blooded murder that warrants a first-degree
murder conviction, but it could also involve a negligent killing in which one
of the felony murderers did not kill anyone. Additionally, it is not clear that
a death sentence for felony murder would satisfy any of the traditional
theories of punishment.97
Before looking specifically at each felony murder element, one caveat
is necessary, which relates to the proposal in Part III. First-degree murders—
ones with a purposeful mens rea and ones where the defendant in question
committed the homicide—can be part of the class of cases that fall under the
heading of felony murder. For instance, an individual that rapes and kills a
significant other as part of a premeditated plan commits “felony murder,” but
the same facts could also give rise to first-degree murder without the felony
murder doctrine. The point is that the category of felony murder is overinclusive because it relies on different parameters and, thus, includes some
cases that fit the Furman–Gregg class of death-eligible cases as well as some
cases that, without the felony murder doctrine, might not even qualify as
murder.

1. Mens Rea
Traditionally, felony murder does not require any mental state with
respect to the homicide.98 It only requires the intent to commit the underlying
felony.99 A survey of state statutes shows that this approach still prevails, at
least with respect to the majority of jurisdictions.100 Twenty-eight states101—

97

See discussion infra Part II.A.2. It is not clear that a felony murderer would deserve the
death penalty (retribution) or that imposing such a sentence could diminish the number of
felony murders (deterrence) because in some cases, there would be no intent to kill.
98
See generally BINDER, supra note 93.
99
Id.
100
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 54.
101
Id. at 54, 56–57. The states are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
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nineteen of which are death penalty jurisdictions102—impose no culpability
requirement at all for felony murder cases.103 These jurisdictions allow
felony‐murder convictions for individuals who cause a human being’s death
during the course of committing felonies, including individuals who were not
negligent and individuals who reasonably believe that their participation in
the felony does not impose risk of death.104
For instance, Georgia’s felony murder statute provides: “A person
commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or
she causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.”105
Similarly, the Tennessee felony murder statute provides that first-degree
murder includes:
A killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first
degree murder, act of terrorism, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping,
aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a
child or aircraft piracy . . . .106

These statutes and other similar statutes make clear that there is no mens
rea requirement with respect to the homicide element of a felony murder
conviction.
Two additional categories of states impose a minimal mens rea
requirement, rising above strict liability, but barely. Eight states,107 five of
which impose the death penalty,108 presume malice when the dangerous
consequences of the defendant’s actions were foreseeable.109 This

102

State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2021) [hereinafter State by State],
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state
[https://perma.cc/5DDE33DK ] (last visited May 19, 2021).
103
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56–57; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a‐54c; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22‐2101; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2‐201; MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.021; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7; see also BINDER,
supra note 93, at 183–89 (sorting the nation’s jurisdictions by what culpability requirement is
required for felony murder liability).
104
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 53.
105
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (West 2020).
106
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202 (West 2020).
107
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56. The states are California, Idaho, Iowa,
Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
108
See State by State, supra note 102.
109
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56; CAL. PENAL CODE § 189; IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 18‐4001, 4003; IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.1; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97–3–19(c); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.010; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–23–1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16‐3‐10; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2–33; People v. Chun, 203 P.3d. 425 (Cal. 2009); People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130
(Cal. 1965); State v. Lankford, 781 P.2d 197, 203 (Idaho 1989); State v. Heemstra, 721
N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 2006); State v. Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1988) (overruled on
other grounds); State v. Taylor, 287 N.W.2d 576, 577 (Iowa 1980); State v. Bennett, 503
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foreseeability standard is tantamount to requiring a mens rea of mere
negligence. Other states, meanwhile, impute malice to the killer even when
he could not have foreseen the danger, making the “malice” offense no more
than a strict liability offense.110 Although there is some variety among these
jurisdictions, they are consistent in setting their mens rea threshold at
negligence or below.111
The second group of manslaughter-mens rea states—six jurisdictions,112
of which two are death penalty states113—requires a mens rea of negligence
to convict an individual of felony murder.114 There is some variation in the
mechanics of these statutes, but they are consistent in turning some crimes
that would be negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter into felony
murder.115 Notably, Texas is among these states, and Texas is responsible for
a third of all of executions nationwide since Furman.116 There are several

N.W.2d 42, 45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); Boyd v. State, 977 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 2008); Lee v. State,
759 So. 2d 390 (Miss. 2000); Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 434 (Nev. 2007); Labastida v. State,
986 P.2d 443 (Nev. 1999); In re Leon, 410 A.2d 121, 124 (R.I. 1980); Lowry v. State, 657
S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 2008); State v. Norris, 328 S.E.2d 339, 342 (S.C. 1985) (overruled on other
grounds); Gore v. Leeke, 199 S.E.2d 755 (S.C. 1973); RALPH KING ANDERSON, JR., S.C.
REQUESTS TO CHARGE-CRIMINAL § 2–1 (2d ed. 2012) (jury instructions on murder); RALPH
KING ANDERSON, JR., S.C. REQUESTS TO CHARGE-CRIMINAL § 2–3 (2d ed. 2012) (jury
instructions on felony murder); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 811, 814, (Va. 1981);
Cotton v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); accord Kennemore v.
Commonwealth, 653 S.E.2d 606, (Va. Ct. App. 2007); see also BINDER, supra note 93, at 183–
89 (describing these jurisdictions as conditioning felony murder on malice, which is
characterized by “the imposition of danger”).
110
BINDER, supra note 93, at 186–89.
111
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56.
112
Id. The states are Alabama, Delaware, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
Id. See ALA. CODE § 13A‐6‐1; id. § 13A‐6‐2 (Official Commentary, 256); id. § 13A‐2‐4(b);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit.11, §§ 635–36; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17‐A, § 202; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:2‐2–3; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(a); id. §§ 2501–2; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02
(2005); id. § 19.01 (1993); Witherspoon v. State, 33 So. 3d 625 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); Ex
parte Mitchell, 936 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985); State v. Martin, 573 A.2d 1359, 1375 (N.J. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Hassine, 490 A.2d 438, 454, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); State v. Rodriguez, 953 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.
App. 1997); State v. Kuykendall, 609 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
113
See State by State, supra note 102.
114
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56.
115
Id.
116
Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2021),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/number-of-executions-by-stateand-region-since-1976 [hereinafter Executions by State and Region Since 1976].
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examples of Texas executing individuals convicted of felony murder who did
not kill.117
Two other jurisdictions, Illinois and North Dakota,118 require a slightly
higher mens rea—recklessness119—for felony murder.120 Neither state has
retained the death penalty.121
Finally, seven jurisdictions,122 including two capital states,123 have
essentially rejected the felony murder rule.124 In these states, the presence of
a felony does not expand murder beyond its traditional mens rea
requirements: purposeful or knowing killing, or, in some cases, extreme
recklessness.125
Collectively, twenty-five of the twenty-seven capital states allow for
felony murder convictions for crimes with a nonmurder mens rea of
negligence or strict liability.126 But “death is different,” so the consequence
of a death sentence makes the substitution of the felony mens rea for the
homicide mens rea especially objectionable. Indeed, the degree to which a
state’s intentional killing of a prisoner is legitimate should rest on the degree
to which the prisoner himself intended to kill their victims.
Professors Binder, Weisberg, and Fissell have correctly argued that
states should require a minimum mens rea of recklessness to impose the death

117
See Executed But Did Not Directly Kill Victim, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2021),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/executed-but-did-not-directlykill-victim (providing a partial list of such cases).
118
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 55–56.
119
See generally Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg, Capital Punishment
of Unintentional Felony Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141 (2017) [hereinafter Binder,
Fissell & Weisberg, Unintentional Felony Murder]; Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert
Weisberg, Unusual: The Death Penalty for Inadvertent Killing, 93 IND. L.J. 549 (2018).
120
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9‐1(a)(3) (2010); id. 5/9‐1(a)(2) (2010); id. 5/2‐8 (1996);
id. 5/9‐1 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1‐16‐01 (1993); id. § 12.1‐02‐02.3 (1973); id. § 12.1‐
02‐02.1, 2.2 (1973); People v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. 1986); People v. McEwen 157, 510
N.E.2d 74, 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
121
See State by State, supra note 102.
122
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 55. The states are Arkansas, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Vermont.
123
See State by State, supra note 102.
124
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5‐10‐102 (2006); id. § 5‐10‐103 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707‐
701 (2006) (no felony murder rule); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (1984) (no felony murder
rule); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1‐b (1974); id. § 626:7(2) (1971); N.M. STAT. § 30‐2‐1
(1978); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316 (Mich. 1980); State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196,
1205 (N.M. 1991); State v. Doucette, 470 A.2d 676, 680 (Vt. 1983); BINDER, supra note 93,
at 183–89.
125
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 508–17.
126
See State by State, supra note 102; ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56.
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penalty.127 If one takes Furman and Gregg seriously, though, perhaps the
threshold should be even higher. Gregg commands that the law should
narrow the class of homicides eligible for the death penalty. The threshold
for murder—extreme recklessness—should not qualify a case for the death
penalty in most circumstances. Instead, a presumption against deatheligibility should exist for cases where the offender’s mens rea falls below
the purposeful threshold. If any case warrants the death penalty under the
Supreme Court’s current framework,128 the individual in question’s mens rea
should exhibit premeditation or some similar level of intentionality in most
cases. If anything, the state’s mens rea, which engages in an intentional,
premeditated killing when it executes someone, should not exceed the
executed individual’s mens rea. To be sure, one should not receive a death
sentence for an accidental killing.
2. Actus Reus
The mens rea issue, though a central complaint against felony murder,
is not the only doctrinal flaw of capital felony murder. The actus reus element
also can, in some situations, make felony murder statutes even less just.
Although most felony murder statutes require that the individual in
question commit the homicide or otherwise cause the death,129 complicity
statutes open the door to felony murder convictions for individuals who did
not act in a way that caused the homicide.130 In the capital context, this can
allow a state to execute an individual who did not kill and did not intend to
kill.131

127

See sources cited supra note 119.
As indicated above, this Article is operating within the practical confines of the current
system. As I have argued elsewhere, the death penalty should be abolished. See William W.
Berry III, The European Prescription for Ending the Death Penalty, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 1003
(2011); Berry, Repudiating Death, supra note 92.
129
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3.
130
See generally Joseph Trigilio & Tracy Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A
Categorical Approach to Proportional Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371 (2011).
131
For a discussion of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on this issue, see
infra Part II.
128
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Complicity doctrine in this context132 can take two forms—(1) aiding
and abetting, and (2) conspiracy.133 When an individual aids and abets
another, complicity law holds the individual liable for the conduct of the
other person if he assists the other person in the commission of an offense.134
Accessory liability thus extends the actus reus requirement to those who
participate and help, including acts they did not commit.135 This accessory
doctrine can implicate individuals that did not participate in the killing and
would otherwise fall outside of the felony murder statute’s actus reus
requirements.
Similarly, conspiracy statutes can cast a wide net over individuals and
attribute the conduct of co-conspirators to them.136 The basis for this
broadening of liability lies in the agreement to participate in the criminal
conspiracy.137 Once an individual agrees to participate, the individual can be
liable for all of his co-conspirators’ criminal conduct done in furtherance of
the conspiracy.138 Perhaps the most extensive version of such liability is
Pinkerton liability, which makes an individual liable for all his coconspirators’ acts even where the criminal conduct goes beyond the original
conspiracy agreement, as long as it is a reasonable and probable
consequence.139
The actus reus problem with complicity and conspiracy statutes mirrors
the mens rea problem previously discussed. Felony murder statutes typically
require an individual to cause the death of another, but complicity and
conspiracy both diminish this requirement. To the extent an individual
actively aids and abets another in killing—such as by physically subduing a
victim so the other can stab the victim to death—the intellectual leap may not
be that significant as the accomplice is acting to cause the death of the victim.
132
Complicity law, like felony murder, has seen its share of criticism. See, e.g., GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 8.5–8.8 (1978); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART §§ 118–41 (2d ed. 1961); Douglas Husak, Abetting a
Crime, 33 L. & PHIL. 41 (2014); Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The
Peculiar Law of Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129 (2013); Michael S. Moore,
Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2007);
Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2000); Joshua
Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions
to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and
Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (1985).
133
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 461.
134
See id.
135
See id.
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
See id.
139
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
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But the complicity doctrine encompasses much more. The modern
application includes the various iterations of common law complicity—
accessory before the fact, accessory after the fact, principal in the second
degree—and simplifies it to focus on assistance in the commission of the
crime.140
Where an individual actively helps in some way, he becomes an
accomplice and faces the same liability as the principal actor. What felony
murder does to this doctrine is limit the requirement to helping with the
felony, but not necessarily the killing. If an individual is an accessory to a
bank robbery, and the principal kills during the robbery, the accomplice is
guilty of felony murder. Just as felony murder statutes typically only require
a mens rea for the underlying felony, accomplice liability under a felony
murder statute typically relates only to the act of assisting in the felony’s
commission.
Another notable wrinkle with complicity law relates to its lack of a
causation requirement. An accomplice is liable for the primary individual’s
conduct even if his assistance was causally unnecessary to the commission
of the offense.141 For example, a getaway driver’s service may not be
necessary to commit the crime, but the driver would be an accomplice
irrespective of the causal connection between the assistance and the
commission of the crime.
This rule undermines the requirement of felony murder statutes that an
individual cause the victim’s death.142 If one is an accomplice, one can be
liable of felony murder even though one’s actions did not cause the felony
crime, much less the death.143 So, if a defendant assists another in the
commission of a crime, even if the assistance was not necessary to commit
the crime, he is an accessory and faces the same criminal liability as the
principal. And if someone dies during the commission of the crime, the
accessory has committed felony murder despite not proximately killing
anyone or helping another kill anyone.
Conspiracy liability for felony murder can go even further than
complicity. In the case of complicity, there exists at least some requirement
of assisting in the felony; with conspiracy, in many cases, the only
affirmative acts that statutes require is an agreement to participate in a crime
and a substantial step toward acting on that agreement. The conspiracy
140
See, e.g., PAUL MARCUS, LINDA A. MALONE, CARA H. DRINAN & WILLIAM W. BERRY
III, CRIMINAL LAW 221–66 (2021).
141
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 472; State ex rel. Martin, Att’y Gen. v. Tally, 15 So. 722,
738–39 (Ala. 1893).
142
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 53.
143
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 472.
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doctrine thus can ensnare individuals who have not taken any affirmative act
toward causing the death of another.
This is not to say that the conspiracy doctrine has no place in criminal
law. Rather, it is problematic in the context of capital felony murder because
death is different. As such, imposing death for such indirect participation
seems a bridge too far. It may not be unreasonable to punish an individual
for participation in a conspiracy that leads to the death of another. But, where
the acts of the individual do not proximately cause a person’s death, capital
felony murder should constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.
Finally, some states apply felony murder statutes where a defendant’s
accomplice or co-conspirator is the sole person to die during the felony—
even at the hands of the police.144 Most jurisdictions follow the agency rule
that an individual can only be liable for deaths caused by his agents and do
not allow felony murder liability for a killing by a nonfelon, but some states
do not follow this rule.145 The agency rule approach makes sense—a bank
robber surely does not intend for the police or a security guard to kill his
accomplice. Further, it is unlikely that a killing by a nonfelon is within the
res gestae of the commission of the felony and, likewise, would be unlikely
to have any significant deterrent effect.146
The felony murder crime’s actus reus and its likelihood of capturing
individuals that did not participate in the homicide through complicity or
conspiracy contravenes Furman’s and Gregg’s death-is-different principle.
That principle aims to impose heightened scrutiny before making a homicide
eligible for the death penalty for accomplices and co-conspirators. Again,
extending criminal liability to such individuals may be appropriate, but
imposing the death penalty seems extreme for those who did not kill or
otherwise cause the death of the victim. Because death is such a unique and
severe punishment, the felony murder doctrine should not include cases
where one would only satisfy the actus reus for murder using complicity or
conspiracy.
As with mens rea, the alternative methods of establishing actus reus also
add individuals to the class of criminal actors eligible for the death penalty.
Rather than help to separate the most culpable offenders from the rest, these
actus reus doctrines can, in individual cases, undermine the constitutional
narrowing requirement.
144
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 527–28. An example of this would be a police killing of
one’s co-felon during a robbery.
145
See State v. Sophophone, 19 P.3d 70, 74–76 (Kan. 2001); State v. Canola, 374 A.2d
20, 29–30 (N.J. 1977); Davis v. Fox, 735 S.E.2d. 259, 262 (W. Va. 2012). But see State v.
Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 407–08 (Wis. 1994).
146
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 528.
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Given the tension between felony murder and the Eighth Amendment’s
principles, it is possible for the Supreme Court to limit capital felony murder
to address these issues. In the next Section, the Article explores the Court’s
application of its evolving standards of decency doctrine to capital felony
murder.
II. THE COURT’S FAILED EIGHTH AMENDMENT FELONY MURDER
JURISPRUDENCE
After Gregg, the Supreme Court established its evolving standards of
decency doctrine as a tool to assess whether a particular category of
punishment was cruel and unusual.147 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court held that
“[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”148
Relying on its death-is-different mantra, the Court applied this principle in
capital cases to assess the constitutionality of death sentences under
particular circumstances.149
A. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS DOCTRINE

The evolving standards of decency doctrine subsequently became the
basis for categorically excluding the imposition of the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment for certain crimes—rape150 and child rape151—and
for certain individuals—intellectually disabled152 and juveniles.153 The

147

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding the death sentences for child rape
unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding death sentences for
juvenile offenders unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding death
sentences for intellectually disabled offenders unconstitutional); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987) (narrowing the holding from Enmund); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(finding death sentences for some felony murders unconstitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (finding death sentences for rape unconstitutional).
148
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Stinneford, Original Meaning of
“Unusual,” supra note 32 (explaining that the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment
was that it would evolve over time); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
149
See cases cited supra note 147.
150
Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
151
Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
152
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (finding Texas’s method for determining
which criminal offenders are intellectually disabled unconstitutional); Hall v. Florida, 572
U.S. 701 (2014) (finding Florida’s method for determining which criminal offenders are
intellectually disabled unconstitutional); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (finding death sentences for
intellectually disabled offenders unconstitutional).
153
The Court extended its categorical exceptions for juveniles to include juvenile life
without parole (JWLOP), barring mandatory JLWOP sentences and JLWOP sentences for
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Court’s application of the evolving standards doctrine involves a two-part
test. First, the Court examines the objective indicia of societal consensus with
respect to the punishment at issue.154 This inquiry involves examining the
states’ practices, as permitted by state statutes, in allowing the kind of
punishment in the context in question—i.e., how many states allow the
execution of juvenile offenders.155 The Court has also relied on other
objective indicia such as jury verdicts, the direction of change within
legislatures, and international norms, but state-counting of statutes remains
the primary inquiry.156
One way to think of this objective inquiry is as a way to measure
unusualness.157 If as society evolves a particular punishment becomes
disfavored and its use becomes rarer, the Court can deem the practice
unconstitutionally rare, such that allowing its continued imposition would
subject the individual to an unusual punishment.
On its face, this approach to measuring unusualness makes sense. The
approach, however, results in the Court’s abdication of its role under the
Constitution as a protector of counter-majoritarian rights.158 The Bill of
Rights, including the Eighth Amendment, serves as a limit upon the exercise
of government power.159 With the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment,
this includes state power.160
non-homicide crimes. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
154
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419–26; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–68; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–17.
155
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419–26; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–68; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–17.
156
See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12; Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–67.
157
William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptive Penumbras (and Juvenile
Offenders), 106 IOWA L. REV. 1, 19 n.103 (2020).
158
This approach is not without analogs among other constitutional provisions. See
generally Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of Evolving Standards, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 365 (2009). But it contains the fundamental flaw that it populates a counter-majoritarian
standard—the Eighth Amendment—with majoritarian consensus. See Berry, Unusual
Deference, supra note 92, at 324–25.
159
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a statute
criminalizing contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a statute
limiting abortion); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (striking down a statute allowing
a non-unanimous jury verdict); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a
statute criminalizing sodomy. Justia has compiled a list of almost a thousand such cases. See
State Laws Held Unconstitutional, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/state-lawsheld-unconstitutional.html [http://perma.cc/M2DP-VM5E] (last visited May 19, 2021); see
also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
160
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2018) (incorporating the excessive fines clause of
the Eighth Amendment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment).
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If the purpose of the Eighth Amendment, at least in part, is thus to
protect individuals against majoritarian interference with the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishments, then it becomes problematic to
determine the meaning of the constitutional provision by extrapolating from
the majority practice. In other words, the counter-majoritarian constitutional
provision loses its ability to protect against majoritarian overreach when the
majority behavior defines the scope of those protections.161
An example is instructive. If all states decided to punish jaywalking by
public stoning followed by crucifixion, the punishment would not be unusual.
The statutes in question that provided for this draconian punishment would
satisfy the objective inquiry of the evolving standards as the majority practice
despite its clear excessive and torturous mode of punishment. Using a
majoritarian approach will be insufficient to protect individual constitutional
rights—including being free from cruel and unusual punishments—from the
whims of the majority.
The second part of the inquiry under the evolving standards doctrine is
a subjective inquiry, where the Court “brings its own judgment to bear.”162
In doing so, the Court looks to the applicable purposes of punishment—
primarily retribution and deterrence in these capital cases163—to assess
whether the punishment practice in question is appropriate. This inquiry
arguably serves as a proxy to measure cruelty. A punishment that does not
meet any legitimate purpose of punishment must be excessive or otherwise
cruel.
Instead of justifying the use of capital felony murder, the evolving
standards of decency reveal the extent of the problems discussed in Part I. As
such, applying the evolving standards to capital felony murder blunts the
Eighth Amendment’s effectiveness in providing clear guidance about capital
felony murder statutes’ constitutionality.
1. Objective Indicia of National Consensus
With respect to the objective indicia, the felony murder rule enjoys
national popularity with forty-three states using some form of the rule.164 The
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See generally William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving Justices? 96 WASH.
U. L. REV. 105 (2018).
162
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
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The other two purposes of punishment—incapacitation and rehabilitation—seem less
applicable to capital punishment and have not been part of the Court’s evolving standards
application. See William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889
(2010); Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231 (2013).
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ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 55–57; discussion, supra Part I.B.
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overwhelming consensus, as discussed above, is to apply a strict liability or
negligence approach to felony murder homicides.165
Although considering the state statutes as similar—all strict liability or
negligence with respect to homicide—would not on its face betray the
arbitrariness in outcomes that concerned the Furman and Gregg courts, the
disparity among cases within the category of felony murder would create
such a disparity, particularly as compared to other first-degree murder cases.
Because felony murder encompasses an extensive and varied range of
kinds of homicide, looking to the objective indicia of the prevalence of felony
murder statutes becomes an ineffective measure of whether handing down
death sentences for particular felony murders is rare. As discussed below, the
Court has attempted to provide some parameters in Enmund166 and Tison,167
but these do not narrow the felony murders that are eligible for the death
penalty in a significant enough way to meet Furman’s and Gregg’s
requirements.
2. The Purposes of Punishment
Even more troubling is the apparent disconnect between felony murder
convictions and the purposes of punishment under the Court’s subjective
inquiry. Simply put, while some felony murders might satisfy the purposes
of retribution, deterrence, or both, it is evident that many others do not. As
such, the evolving standards doctrine is again an ineffective tool to use in
applying the Eighth Amendment to felony murder.
To begin, it is necessary to assess whether any of the purposes of
punishment justify the death penalty’s imposition for felony murder. For
some, it is not clear that any of the purposes of punishment support the death
penalty under any circumstance.168
The purpose of retribution, in its just deserts iteration, holds that the
criminal offender shall receive a punishment no more and no less than what
he deserves.169 For some, no crime rises to the level that it entitles the state
to kill the offender; no offender deserves death.170 Under such a view, the
death penalty is an excessive punishment.171
165

ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 56–57; discussion, supra Part I.B.
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
167
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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See generally VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 55.
170
Dan Markel, State Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death
Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 410 (2005)
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Construed more broadly, if retribution also includes the need to satisfy
democratic norms by effectively communicating censure to an offender, the
death penalty likewise may be excessive.172 In this conception, the point is
the censuring of the offender, and the death penalty is not necessary to
achieve such a communication. The penalty may even be inconsistent with
the democratic ideals the state seeks to communicate.173
Alternatively, if one’s conception of retribution is merely revenge, it is
more difficult to make the argument that the death penalty is an excessive
punishment.174 Rather, one would need to argue, as Justice Marshall did in
Furman, that revenge in itself is an improper motive for punishment.175
Similarly, one may conclude that the death penalty does not deter future
crime. Certainly, the social science evidence points in this direction—the
most one can say in favor of deterrence is that the evidence is inconclusive
about whether the death penalty actually deters future crime.176
Some have argued that the method by which states use the death penalty
in the United States, including a gap of a decade or more between the crime
and the imposition of the death penalty, contributes to the death penalty’s
lack of deterrent value.177 Others insist, despite evidence to the contrary, that
the death penalty does deter and failing to use the death penalty as a
punishment is immoral because of its deterrent value.178
Putting aside these debates about the nature of retribution and
deterrence generally, this Section asks whether, assuming, as the Court has,
that retribution and deterrence provide valid justifications for the death
penalty itself, such purposes can support the imposition of the death penalty
for the crime of felony murder.
a. Retribution
With respect to felony murder, it is not clear that the crime deserves
death. By definition, a felony murder is a death that results from and occurs
during the commission of a crime. The implication is that the risk taken by
172
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 948–50 (2007); see also Dan Markel, Executing
Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163
(2009); Markel, State Be Not Proud, supra note 170.
173
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 55; Markel, State Be Not Proud, supra note
170.
174
If the goal is to take revenge, the death penalty will accomplish this end. LEX TALIONIS.
175
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
176
Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 50, at 794 (noting that “existing evidence for
deterrence is surprisingly fragile”); Steiker, supra note 50.
177
Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 50.
178
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 50.
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engaging in the criminal activity warrants the imposition of a higher level of
punishment based on the criminal offender’s culpability.
If the offender commits a premeditated murder, then the crime is simply
a first-degree murder, not a felony murder.179 As such, felony murder as
explored here involves a death that occurs during the commission of a crime
other than first-degree murder. With respect to retribution, then, the question
becomes whether an offender deserves the death penalty for their criminal
conduct during which a person died.
As discussed above, a felony murder conviction does not require that
the offender commit the actual killing and likewise does not require that the
offender intend that the victim die. For reasons discussed above, mostly
related to deterrence, state felony murder statutes allow the death penalty’s
imposition because the conduct engaged in by the offender created the risk
of death or engaged in the conduct that led to death. It is not clear that such
situations mean that the offender deserves the death penalty.
b. No Intent
First, the severity of a homicide under criminal law has long related to
the offender’s intent. Criminal law treats intentional, premeditated killings
far different from accidental killings. This is because one’s mens rea bears
directly upon their culpability as a criminal offender.
Just deserts retribution uses two primary indicia to assess the desert of
a criminal offender. First, retribution looks to the harm caused by the
offender. In the felony murder context, there must be some causal connection
between the felony and the homicide. In some cases, the attenuated nature of
this connection suggests that retribution might not support the death penalty.
Assume, for instance, that an individual decides to rob a bank by using
a gun to threaten the teller. If a bystander suddenly has a heart attack and dies
(and we assume that the stress the bank robber placed on the bystander caused
the heart attack), the level of desert seems far less than if the robber had shot
the bystander. The robber caused the death, but in an indirect manner. The
more attenuated the causal connection, the weaker the case for the death
penalty.
Perhaps more importantly, the second part of the just deserts inquiry—
the offender’s culpability—can face significant complications with respect
to the death penalty. It is unlikely in many cases that offenders that intend to
commit a crime during which a death happens to occur possess the same level
of culpability as offenders who commit premeditated murder.

179
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As a result, the culpability gap between first-degree, premeditated
murder and felony murder suggests that the death penalty is not appropriate
for felony murder as a means of achieving the purpose of just deserts
retribution. In other words, if just deserts retribution ordains a punishment
that is no more and no less than what an offender deserves, the culpability
gap between first-degree murder and felony murder suggests different
punishments for different crimes.180
c. No Act
The purpose of retribution possesses even less of a connection to felony
murder in cases where the defendant does not participate in the act of killing.
Despite the common use of complicity and conspiracy as the basis for
liability in such circumstances, it is an intellectual leap to suggest that being
an accomplice or a co-conspirator to a felony makes an individual deserve
the death penalty.
For retributive purposes, the key question should be the defendant’s
culpability. When a defendant does not act in a way that proximately causes
death, it stretches credulity to state that they are culpable enough to deserve
a death sentence.
d. Deterrence
Social science indicates that, at best, it is inconclusive whether the death
penalty deters future crime.181 Assuming, though, that the death penalty does
deter crime, the theory of deterrence could justify the imposition of the death
penalty in an individual case. Each case’s underlying facts matter, however,
as some felony murders fall short of the requirement of deterrence. This
happens for two basic reasons: the mens rea problem explained above and
the problem of marginal deterrence.
e. Capital Punishment May Deter the Felony, But It Cannot Deter the Death
Imposing a death sentence for felony murder has the potential to deter
others from committing crimes. To the extent that one is considering
committing a crime, knowing that the death penalty may be possible if an
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The problem with retribution as a purpose of punishment is that it cannot provide
cardinal values for particular crimes; it can only arrange them ordinally. See generally VON
HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 55. As such, it is impossible to say what punishment
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accidental killing occurs might deter some individuals from committing a
felony.
It will be unlikely, however, to deter other felony murders. This is
because many felony murders involve unintentional killings. Once the felony
commences, the ensuing death in many cases of felony murder does not
involve conduct that the death penalty can deter. An easy example of this
involves the bank teller that has a heart attack during the robbery. A felony
murder execution might deter the robbery, but it cannot really deter the death
if one decides to commit the robbery. In other words, there may be some
justification here for deterrence of the felony, but the connection to the
homicide is indirect at best. It is true that deterring the felony would deter the
death, but in order to accomplish such an effect, one would need to use the
death penalty as a sentence for all felony murders.
f. Any Deterrence Would Be Marginal at Best
With deterrence, there also exists the question of the degree to which
increasing the sentence achieves additional deterrence. A twenty-year
sentence might significantly deter some of the conduct that results in felony
murder, but it is not clear that imposing the death penalty would significantly
increase the deterrent effect. The increase in punishment in many cases
achieves only marginal deterrence over other serious punishments.182
This is particularly true in states that do not actively use the death
penalty but impose death sentences. If the leading cause of death for death
row inmates is natural causes, the increase in deterrence achieved by a death
sentence as opposed to a life without parole sentence will likely be negligible.
The practical connection between the known outcome and the sentence can
affect the deterrent value of a sentence. The significant decrease in the
number of executions during the past decade183 and the extensive temporal
lag between the sentencing and the execution both suggest that the death
penalty may have only marginal deterrent value as compared to life-withoutparole sentences.184
B. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF FELONY MURDER CASES

The Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of capital
felony murder under the Eighth Amendment in two cases: Enmund v. Florida
and Tison v. Arizona. Enmund’s effect was to establish some limit on the use
of felony murder in capital cases, but Tison served to significantly
182
183
184

See id.
Executions by State and Region Since 1976, supra note 116.
Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 50.
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circumscribe Enmund’s effect. As explored, the cases fall short of
articulating an Eighth Amendment answer to the problems raised in Part I.185
1. Enmund v. Florida
Enmund involved Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong robbing an elderly
couple, Thomas and Eunice Kersey, one morning at the Kersey residence.186
While Sampson Armstrong was holding Thomas Kersey at gunpoint, Eunice
Kersey emerged from the house and shot Jeanette Armstrong.187 Sampson
Armstrong subsequently shot and killed both Thomas and Eunice Kersey.188
Earl Enmund was seen driving to and from the Kersey’s neighborhood
that morning and played a role as a getaway driver.189 As the Florida Supreme
Court explained, “[T]he only evidence of the degree of his participation is
the jury’s likely inference that he was the person in the car by the side of the
road near the scene of the crimes.”190
The jury convicted Enmund of first-degree felony murder and robbery,
and the judge sentenced Enmund to death consistent with the jury’s
recommendation.191 Specifically, the Court found four aggravating
circumstances: Sampson Armstrong committed the capital felony while
Enmund engaged in or was an accomplice to the commission of an armed
robbery; Armstrong committed the capital felony for pecuniary gain; the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and a court previously
convicted Enmund of a felony involving the use or threat of violence.192 The
trial court did not find any mitigating circumstances.193 On appeal, the U.S.
Supreme Court examined the validity of a death sentence based on a felony
185

There is a persuasive argument that the effect of Enmund and Tison is to set a mens
rea floor of recklessness for capital felony murder, which would mitigate part of the problem.
See generally Binder, Fissell & Weisberg, Unintentional Felony Murder, supra note 119
(arguing for a mens rea recklessness floor as a prerequisite for capital murder).
186
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 784 (1982).
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 786.
191
Id. at 784. Although not part of his case, Enmund’s death sentence also would have
violated the Sixth Amendment if not reversed on Eighth Amendment grounds. See Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016) (requiring a jury imposition of a death sentence); see also
Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66
UCLA L. REV. 448 (2019).
192
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), (h), (1981)).
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the heinous aggravator, and found the pecuniary gain and
robbery aggravators duplicative, but affirmed the sentence with the two aggravators and no
mitigators. Id. at 787.
193
Id. at 785.
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murder conviction for an offender “who neither took life, attempted to take
life, nor intended to take life.”194
Enmund thus concerned the use of the death penalty for a felony murder
conviction where the crime was robbery and another committed the killing.195
Of the thirty-six jurisdictions that permitted the death penalty at the time, the
Court noted that only eight jurisdictions authorized the death penalty for
accomplices in felony murder robbery cases like Enmund without proof of
additional aggravating circumstances.196 In addition, another nine states
allowed death sentences for felony murder accomplices where other
aggravating factors were present.197 The Court found that the legislative
practice weighed “on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime
at issue.”198
In the second part of the evolving standards test, the Enmund Court
brought its own judgment to bear and found that the death sentence was
inappropriate for Enmund.199 Specifically, the Court held that his criminal
culpability did not rise to the level required by just deserts retribution to
warrant a death sentence.200 The Court similarly dismissed deterrence as a
supporting rationale for a death sentence in Enmund’s case.201 Finally, it is
notable that Enmund appeared to focus only on the relevant facts of
Enmund’s case.202 The Court did not explicitly create a categorical rule with
respect to death sentences for felony murder convictions.203
Notice that the Enmund rule excluded cases where there was both no act
and no mens rea related to the homicide in question. It did not extend to
situations where one element was present but not the other. One can imagine
capital felony murder being inappropriate where there is an act but no mens
rea, such as where an individual accidentally kills someone during the
commission of a felony. Or, in the corollary situation, the death penalty
would also be improper where there is a mens rea but no act, such as when

194

Id. at 787.
Id. at 783–85 (showing that Enmund did not kill or intend to kill).
196
Id. at 789.
197
Id. at 791.
198
Id. at 793 (footnote omitted). The Court also considered jury sentences, although a
difficult proposition given the variety in felony murder cases and state felony murder laws. Id.
at 794–96.
199
Id. at 797.
200
Id. at 800–01.
201
Id. at 797–801. To be fair, retribution appears to be the only purpose that could justify
the death penalty, and it might not even accomplish that. See Part III-A infra.
202
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
203
See id.
195
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one is planning to kill after a robbery, but the victim dies of a heart attack
before the individual has the opportunity to kill.
In other words, Enmund applied the Eighth Amendment to a situation
where all of the problems described above were present but did not allow for
an Eighth Amendment solution where only some were present. The facts of
the case provided some limitation, but the evolving standards doctrine
prevented this case from going further. To find a national consensus under
the objective indicia, the Court had to narrow the kind of felony murder in
question as opposed to applying the doctrine to felony murder more
generally. Tison then exacerbated these shortcomings.
2. Tison v. Arizona
The Court narrowed Enmund’s scope five years later in Tison, where it
again considered the Eighth Amendment limitations on felony murder in
capital cases under the evolving standards of decency.204 Tison involved the
prosecution of two of Gary Tison’s sons, after their father and an associate
brutally murdered a family after stealing their car.205 The sons participated
both in helping Tison break out of prison and in the carjacking.206 They were
not present, however, when their father killed the family,207 and they were
unaware that he intended to do so.208
In assessing the jury’s imposition of death sentences on the sons, the
Tison Court considered whether their punishments violated the Eighth
Amendment.209 Like Enmund, the Tison sons argued that they did not take
life, attempt to take life, or intend to take life.210
204

Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152–58 (1987).
Id. at 139–41. For a chilling account of Gary Tison’s escape from prison and
subsequent crime spree, see generally JAMES W. CLARKE, LAST RAMPAGE: THE ESCAPE OF
GARY TISON (1st ed. 1988).
206
Tison, 481 U.S. at 139–40.
207
Id. at 139–41. The facts are harrowing. Gary Tison and Randy Greenawalt and the two
Tison sons were plotting how to escape to Mexico. They needed a new car to drive to avoid
detection by the police. They feigned car trouble on the side of the road. A couple and their
two children, one of which was a baby, decided to stop and help. The escapees pulled a gun
on the family and forced them into the Tison car, which they drove away from the road. Gary
Tison then shot the tires so the family would not be able to drive away. The man in the family
asked for water, as they were being left in the desert. Gary Tison sent his two teenaged sons
back to the other car to get water. He then brutally shot the parents and their two children. A
manhunt ensued, and the sons and Greenawalt were captured. Gary Tison died of exposure in
the desert hiding from the police. Id.
208
Id. Tison’s death may have increased the public desire (or at least that of the
prosecutor) to seek death sentences for his sons. See CLARKE, supra note 205, at 263–66.
209
Tison, 481 U.S. at 152–58.
210
Id. at 150.
205

2021]

CAPITAL FELONY MERGER

639

Using the evolving standards of decency doctrine, the Court applied the
same counting of state statutes as in Enmund but combined the jurisdictions
that allowed felony murder for any accomplice with those that only allowed
felony murder with additional aggravating circumstances.211 The Court
reasoned that, unlike Enmund, the Tison sons played an active role in the
crime (particularly the prison escape), and as a result both categories of
jurisdictions should count, leading to a finding that only eleven jurisdictions
did not allow death sentences in felony murder cases like Tison. 212
The Court’s subjective judgment likewise found that the death sentences
imposed on the Tison sons were not disproportionate.213 Specifically, the
Court cited that the Tison sons’ “reckless indifference to human life”
provided the intent to justify a death sentence, even though the sons did not
participate in the killing itself.214 The distinction, then, between the outcomes
in Enmund and Tison was the intent of the felony murder accomplices.215
Unlike in Enmund, the Tison Court made clear that the majority view did not
provide a consensus view in favor of eliminating the application of the
punishment at issue.216
The Tison Court’s rule was that a capital felony murder is constitutional
when the individuals in question are (1) major participants in the felony and
(2) exhibit a reckless indifference to human life.217 This modified the Enmund
rule as juries could still find individuals that did not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill guilty of capital felony murder.
Note that the shift with respect to the act requirement moves the inquiry
to the relationship of the act to the felony, not the homicide. In addition, the
Tison rule keeps the mens rea connected to the homicide and captures all
reckless actors.
On its face, Tison may be best understood as a case where hard facts
make bad law.218 Given the brutality of the murder and the inability to hold

211

Id. at 152–55.
Id. at 151–55. The Court focused on the recklessness demonstrated by the sons in
busting Tison out of prison, particularly considering their knowledge of his dangerous
character and criminal past. Id.
213
Id. at 155–58.
214
Id. at 157–58.
215
Id. For an argument that a recklessness mens rea should be required for capital
punishment for felony murder, see Binder, Fissell & Weisberg, Unintentional Felony Murder,
supra note 119, at 1142.
216
Tison, 481 U.S. at 157–58.
217
See id. at 151–58.
218
See Winterbottom v. Wright (Exch. 1842) 10 M & W 109, 116 (“This is one of those
unfortunate cases in which . . . it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a
212
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Gary Tison responsible, the death sentences the jury imposed are
unsurprising.219 The Court’s doctrinal shift, though, seems the product of bad
facts as opposed to considered judgment.
One response would have been to create an exception to the Enmund
rule instead of rewriting it. The rule could be that the death penalty is
unavailable in cases where there is no act, attempt, or mens rea, unless the
defendants otherwise bear some culpability. To the extent that the Tison sons
should face the death penalty, it is because they bear serious culpability in
helping their father escape prison and providing him with weapons,
particularly in light of his violent criminal past.
Indeed, the better reading of these cases is to treat Enmund as the rule
and Tison as an exception. Courts have done the opposite, treating Tison as
a modification of Enmund. The effect has been that the Eighth Amendment
does not provide any meaningful limitation in capital felony murder cases.
Accomplice liability and conspiracy liability do not create much of an
obstacle to finding that an individual was a major participant in the felony.
The recklessness mens rea could in theory create some obstacle,220 but courts
have not applied it as such.
C. WHY THE FELONY MURDER EVOLVING STANDARDS FAIL TO
SATISFY FURMAN’S REQUIREMENTS

The Court’s application of the evolving standards doctrine to capital
felony murder does not satisfy either of the Furman requirements. If
anything, the Enmund and Tison holdings, to the extent that they impose any
Eighth Amendment restriction at all, fail to address capital felony murder’s
over-inclusivity issues.
1. Death is not Different
The evolving standards doctrine does not impose heightened
requirements for capital felony murder that take into account the actor’s
culpability with respect to the homicide as the Eighth Amendment requires.
It is not clear that all major felony participants whose recklessness causes a
remedy, but, by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been
frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”).
219
The Governor of Arizona ultimately overturned these sentences on appeal, and the
Tisons are currently serving life sentences. Greenawalt was executed. C.T. Revere,
Greenawalt Executed for Murders, TUCSON CITIZEN (Jan. 23, 1997), http://tucsoncitizen.com/
morgue2/1997/01/23/98025-greenawalt-executed-for-murders/. [https://perma.cc/J5VW-UG
V6].
220
See Binder, Fissell & Weisberg, Unintentional Felony Murder, supra note 119
(arguing for a minimum requirement of a mens rea of recklessness).
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homicide should be eligible for the death penalty. On the contrary, it is
evident that many if not most of the individuals that fall into this category
lack the required culpability to justify death as a punishment.
Rather than developing a robust Eighth Amendment approach to this
problem as Enmund started to do, the evolving standards approach fails to
apply heightened scrutiny to felony murder cases that fall on either side of
the Tison rule. It is not clear, for instance, that the Eighth Amendment
forecloses capital felony murder convictions for individuals that lack an
intentional mens rea with respect to the homicide. It is also not clear that all
individuals that satisfy the Tison test should be death-eligible.
2. The Class of Murderers Is Insufficiently and Inaccurately Narrowed
Along similar lines, the evolving standards of decency doctrine does not
address felony murder’s over- and under-inclusivity with respect to
individuals that might possess a level of culpability that justifies the death
penalty. The objective indicia limit the scope of the Eighth Amendment such
that the robust analysis proposed here becomes impossible.
Likewise, the subjective indicia do not provide clear guidance on where
to draw the line with respect to retribution or deterrence. The Tison categories
certainly do not seem to solve this problem. It is hard to understand how the
major participant and recklessness rules apply to the purposes of punishment.
Perhaps the level of one’s participation bears on one’s culpability, but the
inquiry incorrectly centers on participation in the felony, not the killing. The
recklessness requirement also could relate to culpability, but it is based on
lack of responsibility rather than affirmative intent, meaning that the line will
be difficult to draw. It is hard to say how reckless one must be to be culpable
enough to deserve a death sentence.
Even if the Tison rule could adequately sort the felony murder cases into
death-eligible and death-ineligible categories under the Eighth Amendment,
the sorting would be inaccurate. The basis for the sorting relates only partly
to the homicide and focuses partly on the felony. Whether an individual was
a major participant in the homicide seems a better question than whether the
individual was a major participant in the felony. Again, the problem is one
of over- and under-inclusivity. There may be cases where an individual is a
minor participant in the felony, but a major participant in the killing, such as
the getaway driver that runs over a bystander as the felons are escaping.
There may also be cases where the individual is a major participant in the
felony but plays no role in the killing, such as where individuals are robbing
different parts of a bank and the death occurs in an area that the major
participant does not even enter.
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The same disconnect also applies to Tison’s recklessness requirement.
The recklessness threshold does little to sort second-degree murder cases—
the common application of reckless indifference to human life—from the
intentional, premeditated murders that typically constitute first-degree
murder. The evolving standards doctrine renders the Eighth Amendment
impotent in its ability to limit the co-opting of the felony murder doctrine as
a tool to elevate second-degree killings into capital murders.
The approach below seeks to offer an alternative means to address this
issue.
III. A CAPITAL FELONY MERGER DOCTRINE
Having explored the constitutional infirmities of felony murder and the
Supreme Court’s failed attempts to create a palatable Eighth Amendment
doctrine using the evolving standards of decency, this Section proposes a
unique remedy based on a felony murder doctrinal limitation courts
impose—the independent felony merger doctrine.
A. THE INDEPENDENT FELONY MURDER MERGER DOCTRINE

Felony murder, as discussed above, elevates the felony crime in
question to murder when an individual dies during the commission of a
felony. Though the felony in question must be inherently dangerous,221 the
felony must be independent of the homicide under the merger doctrine. In
other words, the individual must commit some other felony besides killing to
be guilty of felony murder.
Where the criminal act is part of the killing, it merges into the homicide
crime and cannot be a felony murder.222 This typically occurs in assault cases.
The crime of assault proscribes the use of physical force to injure another.
When the physical force of an assault results in a homicide, the independent
felony merger doctrine merges the felony murder crime into the assault crime
such that the possible prosecutions can be for assault and homicide, but not
felony murder.
If charged as a homicide crime, the assault will be second-degree
murder or manslaughter but will not be a first-degree murder because of the
criminal actor’s mens rea. Because the act involved in the felony of assault

221

See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also MARCUS, MALONE, DRINAN &
BERRY, supra note 140, at 462–71.
222
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and the killing is the same, the felony cannot be the basis for a felony murder
conviction, as it is not an independent felony. 223
Without the merger doctrine, a prosecutor could charge every seconddegree assault homicide as a first-degree felony murder eligible for the death
penalty. The independent felony requirement exists to prevent an end run
around homicide’s mens rea requirements through the use of felony murder
when the act in question is the same for both crimes.224
B. A CAPITAL FELONY MERGER DOCTRINE

This Article proposes applying the merger doctrine to capital cases.
After Gregg, to satisfy the Eighth Amendment, states must impose some
statutory tool to narrow the class of homicides eligible for the death penalty.
Most states accomplish this through aggravating factors, which the state must
prove at trial to make the individual eligible for the death penalty at
sentencing.
One of the most commonly used statutory aggravating factors is felony
murder.225 The crime of felony murder allows the state to take cases that
otherwise would not qualify as a first-degree murder and make them eligible
for the death penalty.226
My proposal is this: under a capital felony merger doctrine, the crime of
felony murder and any felony murder aggravating factor would merge into
first-degree murder for death penalty purposes, just like assault homicides
cannot be the basis for felony murder convictions. To be death-eligible, there
must be an independent basis for such eligibility outside of felony murder.
The first-degree murder and accompanying aggravating factor that gave rise
to death eligibility could not be the felony murder rule or a felony murder
aggravator.
To be clear, this proposal would not abolish the crime of felony murder;
it would just require some other basis for the crime in question to be eligible
for the death penalty. And felony murder could still be a form of first-degree
murder, just not a death-eligible one, unless some other aggravating factor
exists.
This merger limitation would take effect both in the crime of felony
murder’s definition and in aggravating factors related to felony murder. A

223
See sources supra note 64 (explaining the merger doctrine); see also MARCUS,
MALONE, DRINAN & BERRY, supra note 140, at 462–71.
224
See sources supra note 64 (explaining the merger doctrine); see also MARCUS,
MALONE, DRINAN & BERRY, supra note 140, at 462–71.
225
Aggravating Factors by State, supra note 47.
226
See discussion supra Part I.
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felony murder conviction that previously would confer death eligibility
solely on the basis of the felony murder would merge into first-degree
murder; if the crime could satisfy the mens rea and actus reus requirements
of first-degree murder, it could still be death-eligible. Similarly, a prosecutor
could not rely on a felony murder-type of aggravating factor to establish
death-eligibility but could establish death eligibility through other
aggravating factors under the capital felony merger doctrine.
In addition to merging capital felony murder into first-degree murder,
the capital felony merger doctrine would also merge complicity and
conspiracy homicides into first-degree murder. Accomplices and coconspirators would have to have an independent basis for death-eligibility
aside from their involvement in a crime during which a death occurred. One
could not receive the death penalty by being an accomplice to a homicide;
there would need to be an independent basis (non-complicity first-degree
murder) to impose capital punishment. Similarly, one could not receive the
death penalty for being a co-conspirator to a homicide; there would need to
be an independent basis (non-conspiracy murder) to impose capital
punishment.
The felony merger doctrine would supersede all state statutes in
question—felony murder, complicity, and conspiracy—because it is the
manifestation of a constitutional requirement. Under the Eighth Amendment,
arbitrary and random imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional.
Failing to have some method of narrowing the death-eligible murders from
the non-death-eligible murders violates the Eighth Amendment. Though state
capital schemes currently have, in theory,227 more guidance than the Furman
statutes did, the use of felony murder, complicity, and conspiracy all can
interfere with the constitutional narrowing. These doctrines do this by
introducing cases that should not be eligible for the death penalty into the
group of death-eligible cases, counteracting the narrowing that the other parts
of the statutory scheme attempt to achieve.
As with the independent felony murder doctrine, which renders felony
murder inapplicable in assault cases, so, too, would the capital felony merger
doctrine render capital felony murder, capital complicity murder, and capital
conspiracy murder inapplicable. As an Eighth Amendment limitation, the
capital felony merger doctrine would serve to bar use of these murder
doctrines as a basis for establishing death eligibility.

227
But see Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 909 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (PostFurman capital statutes in theory cured the flaws of the death penalty by giving more guidance
to juries, but as Breyer argues, they have done little in practice to alleviate the random and
arbitrary application of the death penalty).
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In practice, the capital felony merger doctrine would simply exclude
felony murder from consideration at capital sentencing; there would have to
be some other aggravating factor or element that justified the death penalty’s
imposition. Similarly, the capital felony merger doctrine would not eliminate
first-degree complicity murder convictions or first-degree conspiracy murder
convictions. But these doctrines could not provide a means, through statute
or aggravating factor, to allow for consideration of the death penalty.
The elevation of a doctrine of statutory interpretation to a constitutional
doctrine under the Eighth Amendment admittedly requires openness to
creative solutions. Before explaining the doctrine’s justifications, it is
important to emphasize its constitutional grounding.
First, the doctrine is appropriate under the Court’s mantra that death is
different. Capital punishment’s consequences are unique in severity and
irrevocable. The extent to which a state subjects individuals to unfair,
draconian, excessive, and inappropriate death sentences is the extent to which
the Eighth Amendment should play an important role in limiting such
injustices.
States would not have to abandon felony murder under this approach.
In the same way that the independent felony murder doctrine eliminates
assault felony murder convictions, the capital felony merger doctrine would
eliminate capital felony murder convictions and sentences. Death is different,
which warrants a doctrinal limitation on who is eligible for the death penalty.
Second, Furman’s and Gregg’s narrowing requirement is incompatible
with capital felony murder, complicity-based capital murder, and conspiracybased capital murder. The goal of trying to separate murders based on
culpability in terms of applying the death penalty is difficult enough to
accomplish without major difficulties.228 As described above, the felony
murder statutes and aggravating factors do not accurately narrow the class of
death-eligible felons. Instead, the felony murder rule complicates the picture
by adding a mix of cases into the death-eligible category, undermining any
legitimate separation that other aggravating factors might be able to achieve.
The capital felony merger doctrine ensures that cases with insufficient
actus reus or mens rea facts to merit first-degree murder do not somehow find
their way into the pool of death-eligible cases. The capital felony merger
doctrine is thus appropriate as a means to fulfill Furman’s and Gregg’s
requirements in the same manner that aggravating factors and proportionality
review should.

228
Indeed, the American death penalty is broken. See id. at 908–48 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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The capital felony merger doctrine also helps clarify the application of
other aggravating factors to better fulfill the Eighth Amendment narrowing
function. The killing of a police officer, for instance, provides an aggravating
factor that makes a case death-eligible.229 Using a capital felony merger
doctrine ensures that only intentional killings of police officers, and not
accidental ones, are eligible for the death penalty. The use of aggravating
factors presumes an individual has committed a first-degree murder; using
the felony merger doctrine ensures that the underlying homicide is deatheligible before applying aggravating circumstances to the equation.
One final issue is worth discussing: retroactivity. If the Court elects to
adopt the capital felony merger rule, it should apply to those convicted of
capital felony murder or through accomplice or conspiratorial liability. Under
Teague, new substantive rules of constitutional law apply retroactively, while
new procedural rules of constitutional law do not unless they are watershed
rules of criminal procedure.230 The capital felony merger rule is a substantive
one—it offers a substantive bar to the use of certain kinds of doctrines to
achieve death-eligibility. Although there may be procedural elements to this
idea, the capital felony merger doctrine constitutes a substantive bar to the
devaluation of the mens rea and actus reus requirements of first-degree
murder.
In light of Teague, then, the capital felony merger doctrine would
presumptively commute all death sentences arising out of felony murder,
complicity, and conspiracy to life sentences. Where the state could show that
an alternative basis existed for death-eligibility, the death sentence would
stand, consistent with the capital felony merger doctrine. It would be the
state’s burden to demonstrate that there existed grounds for death eligibility.
C. AN EXAMPLE

To illustrate how the capital felony merger doctrine would work, an
example is instructive. Assume three individuals form a conspiracy to rob a
bank. Al and Ben will enter the bank carrying handguns, and Carl will circle
the building in the getaway car.
Al and Ben succeed in their robbery, entering the building while the
security guard is in the bathroom. They point their guns at the teller, get their
bags filled with cash, and head for the door. Ben drops his gun, and it goes
off and kills an oblivious customer, Donald, who has just entered the bank.

229
230

See Aggravating Factors by State, supra note 47.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300–03 (1989).
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Under most state felony murder laws, Al, Ben, and Carl could receive a
felony murder conviction and the death penalty for killing Donald.231
The felony merger doctrine would bar the imposition of the death
penalty. For Al, as an accomplice who did not kill or intend to kill, his
conduct would not constitute a first-degree murder on its own. Because the
felony murder conviction would have to rise to the level of first-degree
murder under the capital merger doctrine, he would be ineligible for the death
penalty.
The same would be true for Carl as a co-conspirator. He could be guilty
of felony murder, but would be ineligible for the death penalty, because when
merged with murder the crime would not rise to the level of first-degree
murder, as his only role in the crime was as a getaway driver.
Finally, Ben’s killing of Donald, while a felony murder, also was not a
first-degree murder as he did not intend to kill Donald and, so, he likewise
would be ineligible for the death penalty. The felony murder would merge
into the degrees of murder for purposes of death eligibility; Ben’s act did not
reflect the intentionality needed to establish murder, much less capital
murder.
IV. THE CASE FOR A CAPITAL FELONY MERGER DOCTRINE
Having explained how the capital felony merger doctrine works, the
Article concludes by explaining why this idea helps solve the capital felony
murder infirmities described earlier. Note that this is not the only way to
make sure that the Eighth Amendment’s application bars the unjust use of
the death penalty in felony murder cases. It nonetheless provides a simple
way to place a clear, bright-line limitation on defendants who should not
receive the death penalty.
A. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS DOCTRINE HAS FAILED

The evolving standards doctrine is inadequate to address the injustices
inherent in the current use of capital felony murder. Neither the Enmund nor
the Tison test provides a satisfactory way to separate the cases that the Eighth
Amendment should bar from the death penalty from those that it should not.
Certainly, cases where individuals do not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill
should not be death eligible, but it is not clear that all major felony
participants that act with reckless indifference to human life should be either.
Instead, the capital felony merger doctrine eliminates the arbitrary line
drawing that felony murder prompts, consistent with Furman’s goal of
eliminating the death penalty’s arbitrary application. This doctrine does not
231

See, e.g., ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 53.
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require consensus and does not rest on some evolution of decency. Rather, it
arrests the use of capital felony murder as a tool by which a state can execute
individuals guilty of no more than second-degree murder.
B. MENS REA AND ACTUS REUS SHOULD MATTER

By eliminating cases that have a mens rea below first-degree murder,
the capital felony merger doctrine makes mens rea matter. In practice,
homicide cases that involve a mens rea below purposeful should be ineligible
for the death penalty in most situations.
To the extent that a state includes “knowing” and perhaps even
“extremely reckless” killings in its first-degree murder definition, such
crimes would be death-eligible under the capital felony merger doctrine, but
they would at least have to satisfy a threshold of heightened intent and
culpability. The capital felony merger doctrine would, by contrast, exclude
all strict liability and negligent homicides from the death penalty. In so doing,
this doctrine would signify the mens rea’s importance and restore it to its
proper relationship to the death penalty.
In the same way that the capital felony merger doctrine would rescue
mens rea from the transgressions of capital felony murder, the doctrine also
would prevent unjust death sentences where the individual did not act to
further the homicide (as in Enmund). It would eliminate accomplice death
sentences and instead require that there be an independent basis for an
accomplice to receive the death penalty. Also, for co-conspirators that did
not commit an affirmative act toward the killing (thus providing an
independent basis for death-eligibility), the death penalty would be
unavailable. The capital felony merger doctrine would cure the disturbingly
common issue of individuals receiving the death penalty in cases where they
did not kill anyone or otherwise cause anyone’s death.
C. THE DOCTRINE ACCURATELY SORTS CASES

Finally, the capital felony merger doctrine accurately sorts cases for
capital punishment purposes in a way that the evolving standards cannot. It
draws a line that eliminates the prosecutorial tools that allowed for the
elevation of second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide
crimes to first-degree, death-eligible murders.
The proliferation of aggravating factors in most capital punishment
states means that eliminating the tools of felony murder, complicity, and
conspiracy will not impede the state from pursuing the death penalty in the
most serious cases. But it will help sort the more serious criminal actors from
the less serious ones. In addition, this doctrine’s retroactive application could
significantly decrease the death penalty’s costs to the state (assuming state
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attorney general offices would not try to relitigate every reversed capital
case).
Death penalty supporters should welcome this reform as a way to
remedy the erroneous sorting of cases. The capital felony merger doctrine
offers a more balanced approach that can help restore some of the death
penalty’s legitimacy.
Death penalty abolitionists likewise should favor a constitutional capital
felony merger doctrine. At the very least, this doctrine will have a significant
impact in remedying the unjust application of the death penalty. Although
any execution is a problem from the abolitionists’ perspective, abolitionists
find felony murder capital cases to be particularly troubling miscarriages of
justice. This doctrine’s retroactive application could also thin out death rows
in some states.
CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced a novel approach to the problems created by
capital felony murder (and capital complicity and conspiracy murder).
Specifically, it has argued for the creation of an Eighth Amendment merger
doctrine by which felony murder, complicity, and conspiracy cases are
merged into first-degree murder, such that they cannot provide an
independent basis for death eligibility. This constitutional doctrine has the
ability to improve the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing function to decrease
the death penalty’s unjust imposition on individuals that did not intend to kill
or did not kill.

